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The Fair Housing Act, the Communications Decency 
Act, and the Right of Roommate Seekers  
to Discriminate Online 
Kevin M. Wilemon∗ 
“Risking overstatement only slightly, the Internet represents a 
brave new world of free speech.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
When the 90th Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, it could not predict all of the contexts in which the Fair 
Housing Act2 (“FHA”) would be applied. Just as the 90th Congress 
could not have envisioned the FHA’s application to cyberspace, the 
104th Congress seemingly failed to foresee that the Communications 
Decency Act3 (“CDA”) would immunize Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) from publishing prohibited advertisements that are patently 
illegal in any other context.4 As advertisers shift from classified 
advertising in newspapers to advertisements online5 and individuals 
 
 ∗ J.D. (2009), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law; B.A., magna cum 
laude (2004), The University of Memphis. Thanks to my mother, Michelle, and my 
grandmother, Elizabeth, as well as the rest of my family, for their love and support. Special 
thanks (as always) to my wife, Laura, for everything. 
 1. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting Bruce W. 
Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment in an 
Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (1996)). 
 2. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).  
 3. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560, 561 (2006). 
 4. Congress’ failure to take the FHA into account is remarkable given that Congress 
amended the FHA during the same session the CDA was passed. See Jennifer C. Chang, Note, 
In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The Implications of the Communications Decency 
Act for Fair Housing on the Internet, 55 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1003 (2002). 
 5. For example, classified advertisement site Craigslist is used by twenty-five million 
people each month and receives twenty million self-published advertisements each month. 
Keith McArthur, The Hippie Gets a Job; Craigslist’s Free Online Classified Ads Aren’t the 
Route to Quick Riches, But CEO Jim Buckmaster Likes It That Way, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), 
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increasingly turn to the Internet to communicate,6 a major concern is 
the implication of that shift to the enforcement of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(c),7 the FHA provision prohibiting the use of discriminatory 
advertising in housing.8 
Case law construing the CDA, which seems to explicitly exempt 
“interactive computer services”9 (“ICSs”) from liability for third-
party content, has been favorable to ISPs and to Web sites. Recently, 
however, a few courts have shifted slightly the interpretation of the 
CDA, weakening broad immunity for ISPs. Dicta in several cases and 
reasoning from decisions in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have 
foreshadowed a faint reigning in of 47 U.S.C. § 230 immunity. 
However slight this shift may be and regardless of whether 
Congress specifically intended to void the application of § 3604(c) to 
online speech, it is important that Web sites remain immunized by the 
CDA in order for housing advertisements to continue to be 
widespread. The empowerment of individuals to place advertisements 
 
Aug. 9, 2007, at B7, available at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM. 
20070808.gtcraig0808/BNStory/GlobeTQ/home. 
 6. According to the Pew Internet and American Life Project, 72% of American adults 
use the Internet on an average day, and 91% of American adults have used an Internet search 
engine to find information. http://www.pewinternet.org/trends.asp (follow “Online Activities—
Daily” hyperlink; then follow “Online Activities—Total” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 
2008). There were more than 209 million adult Americans in 2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. 
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS 2000 PROFILE 2 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-us.pdf.  
 7. This Note will refer to the FHA’s discriminatory advertising prohibition as 
“§ 3604(c).” 
 8. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 4; Stephen Collins, Comment, Saving Fair Housing on 
the Internet: The Case for Amending the Communications Decency Act, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1471 (2008); J. Andrew Crossett, Note, Unfair Housing on the Internet: The Effect of the 
Communications Decency Act on the Fair Housing Act, 73 MO. L. REV. 195 (2008); Diane J. 
Klein & Charles Doskow, Housingdiscrimination.com? The Ninth Circuit (Mostly) Puts Out the 
Welcome Mat for Fair Housing Act Suits Against Roommate-Matching Websites, 38 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 329 (2008); Rachel Kurth, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Civil 
Rights and Free Speech on the Internet: The Fair Housing Act vs. The Communications 
Decency Act, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 805 (2007); James D. Shanahan, Note, Rethinking 
the Communications Decency Act: Eliminating Statutory Protections of Discriminatory 
Housing Advertisements on the Internet, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 135 (2007); Jeffrey M. Sussman, 
Note, Cyberspace: An Emerging Safe Haven for Housing Discrimination, 19 LOY. CONSUMER 
L. REV. 194 (2007). 
 9. An ICS is “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides 
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a 
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/14
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online and easily locate others with whom to live is an important step 
in furthering housing integration. Courts will not categorize ICSs as 
publishers of third-party content unless the ICSs have solicited and 
manipulated content.10 Yet the exact extent to which courts will allow 
such activity without losing immunity is not yet clear. 
This Note proposes that the tension between the FHA and the 
CDA be resolved in favor of ISPs and Web sites that do not take 
substantial steps in the creation of information until clear rules are 
delineated for them to follow. In the absence of bright-line rules from 
courts, Congress should step in and provide those rules. This Note 
further proposes that Congress should ensure that roommate seekers 
subject only to § 3604(c) of the FHA should not be prevented from 
placing discriminatory housing advertisements online. Because 
access to housing has greatly improved since the passage of Title VII, 
and because § 3604(c) places too great a burden on the rights to free 
speech and intimate association, Congress should not prohibit 
individuals qualifying for the “Mrs. Murphy” exemption11 from 
placing advertisements online evincing a discriminatory preference.  
This Note will analyze the courts’ recent shift and its potential 
impact on CDA immunity. Part I12 examines landmark cases 
involving the Fair Housing Act and § 3604(c)’s prohibition of 
discriminatory advertising. It will demonstrate that the broad 
construction of the Act by the Supreme Court and various courts of 
appeals is in keeping with the FHA’s policy of promoting fair 
housing practices to the fullest extent allowable under the 
Constitution.13 Part II14 discusses important cases interpreting the 
CDA’s § 230 grant of immunity to ISPs hosting third-party content. 
That Part will show the expansive interpretation courts have given 
this part of the CDA, including immunizing Web sites from civil 
rights claims under the FHA.15 The court decisions that have 
 
 10. See infra discussion Part II. 
 11. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 12. See infra notes 79–135 and accompanying text. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). 
 14. See infra notes 88–135 and accompanying text. 
 15. Section 230 immunity has been applied in multiple contexts, including “defamation 
actions . . . negligence, unfair competition laws, contract claims, and even breaches of state 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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weakened slightly CDA immunity have not yet led to any successful 
FHA claims.16  
Part III17 analyzes the tension between these two competing 
statutes, arguing that Congress will have to intervene in order to 
harmonize them if § 3604(c) is going to have any application to 
online housing advertisements. However, Part III will consider the 
different contexts in which the FHA is now applied, not only online 
rather than in newspapers, but also in a society in which access to 
housing is no longer the widespread problem it once was. It will also 
take into account the unique position of online roommate advertising, 
as well as the free speech rights and freedom of association rights of 
individuals who qualify for the “Mrs. Murphy” exemption. Part III 
ultimately contends that individuals should be free from liability 
when they state discriminatory preferences in online roommate 
advertisements.18 
I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
Section 3604(c) makes it illegal:  
To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or 
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect 
to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
 
securities laws and cyberstalking.” Olivera Medenica, The Immutable Tort of Cyber-
Defamation, J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2008, at 3, 5 (2008). 
 16. But see Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding a Web site responsible for some third-party 
content and remanding to the district court to determine if FHA violations occurred). See also 
infra notes 127–35 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 136–71 and accompanying text. 
 18. An individual who feels discriminated against because of an online advertisement 
currently has a cause of action under § 3604(c) against the person who posted the content on the 
Web site. Sussman, supra note 8, at 217. For a discussion of obtaining personal jurisdiction 
based on an individual’s Internet use, see Kevin R. Lyn, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: 
Is a Home Page Enough to Satisfy Minimum Contacts?, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 341, 358–66 
(2000); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a 
Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147, 1166–84 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/14
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handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to 
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.19 
There are a few exceptions to the FHA’s substantive coverage in 
§ 3604, including “any single-family house sold or rented by an 
owner” who meets certain requirements and “rooms or units in 
dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be 
occupied by no more than four families living independently of each 
other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living 
quarters as his residence.”20 However, § 3604(c) applies to “any 
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental 
of a dwelling”21 and does not require proof of an intention to 
discriminate.22 The FHA’s extensive legislative history “produced 
little material concerning the provision that became 3604(c).”23 
In 1972, the Fourth Circuit heard United States v. Hunter,24 the 
first major case challenging § 3604(c).25 The Attorney General 
 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006). The FHA’s original protections were race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin. Congress added disability (“handicap”) and familial status (living with 
or having custody of a minor) in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-430, 
102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2006)). These 
amendments also strengthened the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) 
enforcement mechanisms. Id. §§ 3610–3614. 
 20. Id. § 3603(b)(1), (2). 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) is commonly known as the “Mrs. 
Murphy” exemption. Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Housing Statements and 3604(c): A 
New Look at the Fair Housing Act’s Most Intriguing Provision, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 187, 
191 n.10 (2001). For a critique of the Mrs. Murphy exemption, see James D. Walsh, Note, 
Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing 
Act, 34 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 605 (1999). The two other FHA exemptions allow religious 
organizations and private clubs to “giv[e] preference” to members as long as housing is 
provided “for other than a commercial purpose.” 42 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2006). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added). 
 22. JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 2:6, at 2–15 
(2006). 
 23. Schwemm, supra note 20, at 198 (describing the floor debates, only a few of which 
discussed the advertising provision, as the main source of congressional comment on the FHA’s 
individual provisions). For a detailed account of the FHA’s passage, see Jean Eberhart 
Dubosfsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 
(1969); Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 199, 207–12 (1978); Aric Short, Post-Acquisition Harassment and the Scope of 
the Fair Housing Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 203, 222–39 (2006). 
 24. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 
(1972). 
 25. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 38 n.39 (1983). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sought an injunction26 against the defendant’s newspaper after it 
published two classified advertisements for an apartment in a “white 
home.”27 The defendant argued that § 3604(c) was not intended to 
apply to newspapers, that it was unconstitutional as applied to the 
defendant, and that the phrase “white home” did not violate the Act.28 
Focusing on the plain language of § 3604(c), the court reasoned that 
“[i]n the context of classified real estate advertising, landlords and 
brokers ‘cause’ advertisements to be printed or published and 
generally newspapers ‘print’ and ‘publish’ them,” bringing landlords 
and newspapers within § 3604(c)’s domain.29 Citing the FHA’s 
legislative history as “evidence that the publication of discriminatory 
classified advertisements in newspapers was precisely one of the 
evils the Act was designed to correct,” the court concluded that 
§ 3604(c) applied to all publishing media, including newspapers.30  
The court also dismissed Hunter’s claim that the FHA violated the 
newspaper’s First Amendment31 right to freedom of the press, relying 
on “an unbroken line of authority from the Supreme Court down” 
emphasizing the government’s ability to regulate commercial 
advertising.32 In response to the defendant’s argument that the phrase 
“white home” is not discriminatory, the court relied on three 
propositions. First, the court believed that the “natural interpretation 
 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 allows the Attorney General to bring suit in district court when she 
has a “reasonable belief” that there is a “pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of 
any of the rights granted by” the FHA, or if a particular denial of rights “raises an issue of 
general public importance.” 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2006). 
 27. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 210. 
 30. Id. at 211 (citing Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114 and S. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on 
Hous. and Urban Affairs, S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 386, 388 (1967) 
(testimony of George Meany)). 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”). 
 32. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 211 (citing cases that have since lost some of their effect due to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence expanding protection of commercial speech). See, e.g., Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (“[S]peech which does 
‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’ [does not] lack[] all [First Amendment] 
protection.”). However, Hunter’s holding that § 3604(c) does not violate the First Amendment 
has not been overturned “because all constitutional challenges to Title VIII have thus far been 
rejected.” ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 6:3 
(1990).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/14
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of the advertisements” by an “ordinary reader” would “indicate a 
racial preference in the acceptance of tenants.”33 Second, the 
individual who placed the advertisements admitted that his use of the 
phrase “white home” was intended to signal his racial preference.34 
Finally, the court also relied on the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations that applied the FHA to 
newspapers and presumed that phrases like “white home” are 
discriminatory.35  
Later in the same year that Hunter was decided, the Supreme 
Court heard Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,36 its first 
Title VIII case.37 Two tenants sued the owner of their apartment 
complex for discriminating against non-whites.38 By actively 
opposing integration, the plaintiffs alleged that the owner had 
deprived them of “the social benefits of living in an integrated 
community.”39 This deprivation caused the plaintiffs to suffer 
emotional and economic damages because they were “‘stigmatized’ 
as residents of a ‘white ghetto.’”40 The district court dismissed the 
case, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue as an 
“aggrieved person” under the FHA.41 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal.42 
 
 33. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 215. For a critique of the “ordinary reader” standard, see Andrene 
N. Plummer, Comment, A Few New Solutions to a Very Old Problem: How the Fair Housing 
Act Can Be Improved to Deter Discriminatory Conduct By Real Estate Brokers, 47 HOW. L.J. 
163, 179–80 (2003) (“While it has helped to resolve some housing discrimination cases, the 
ordinary reader standard falls short of its intended mark. . . . [T]he ordinary reader test needs to 
be amended to accommodate the relevant audience.”). 
 34. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 215. “The defendant” later explained his reason for including the 
phrase in his ad: ‘It’s really a kindness to colored people. There’s no use making them * * * 
come here when I’m not going to rent to them.’” Id. (alteration in original).  
 35. Id. at 215 n.11 (citing Advertising Guidelines for Fair Housing, 37 Fed. Reg. 6700 
(Apr. 1, 1972)). 
 36. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 37. SCHWEMM, supra note 25, at 39. 
 38. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 206–07. 
 39. Id. at 205. 
 40. Id. at 208. 
 41. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (2006) defines an “aggrieved person” as “any person who—(1)  
claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such 
person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3602(i)(1)-(2) (2006). Section 3620 gives an aggrieved person the right to file a HUD 
complaint within one year of a discriminatory incident. Id. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). Section 3613 
allows an aggrieved person to file a civil action in federal or state court within two years of a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit on the issue of standing and remanded the case.43 Given “that 
complaints by private persons are the primary method of obtaining 
compliance with the Act,” the Court construed standing under the 
statute to reach as broadly as the Constitution allowed.44  
The last significant case to analyze § 3604(c)’s application to 
newspapers was Ragin v. New York Times Co.45 Individual African 
American housing seekers46 sued the New York Times’s publisher for 
violating § 3604(c) by running housing advertisements indicating 
racial preferences based on the human models used.47 The court 
began by analyzing the terms “indicates,”48 which resulted in the 
court’s adoption of Hunter’s ordinary reader standard, and 
“preference,”49 which suggested that Congress meant to capture any 
discriminatory housing advertisement, even if it were subtle.50 Like 
the Fourth Circuit in Hunter, the Second Circuit relied on HUD 
regulations to show that the practice at issue was discriminatory.51 In 
 
discriminatory incident. Id. 3613(a)(1)(A). For a critique of the enforcement options available 
to individuals under the FHA, see Terry W. Gentle, Jr., Note, Rethinking Conciliation Under 
the Fair Housing Act, 67 TENN. L. REV. 425, 427 (2000) (arguing that conciliation procedures 
limit the effectiveness of the FHA and “should be abandoned in favor of more formal systems 
of dispute resolution”). 
 42. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208. 
 43. Id. at 212. 
 44. Id. at 209. (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)). 
The D.C. Circuit has espoused the same view. See Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 
27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Ginsburg, J.) (“No ‘prudential standing’ inquiry is in order, however, 
because Congress intended standing under the Fair Housing Act to extend to the full limits of 
Article III.”) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982)). 
 45. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 
(1991). 
 46. Open Housing Center, Inc., a non-profit fair housing group, also sued the newspaper. 
Id. at 998. For a summary of standing principles applied to fair housing organizations, see Dash 
T. Douglas, Standing on Shaky Ground: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 34 AKRON L. 
REV. 613, 624–34 (2001). 
 47. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 998. The advertisements featured either exclusively all white 
models, or African-American models only in predominantly African-American neighborhoods, 
over a twenty year period. Id.  
 48. Id. at 999. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 999–1000. “Ordinary readers may reasonably infer a racial message from 
advertisements that are more subtle than the hypothetical swastika or burning cross, and we 
read the word ‘preference’ to describe any ad that would discourage an ordinary reader of a 
particular race from answering it.” Id. 
 51. Id. at 1000 n.1 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 109.30(b) (1990)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/14
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response to the newspaper’s First Amendment challenge, the court 
held “that real estate advertisements that indicate a racial preference 
‘further an illegal commercial activity: racial discrimination in the 
sale or rental of real estate.’”52  
The Times also argued that charging it with the responsibility of 
ensuring that the advertisements it published conformed to the FHA 
was an unconstitutional burden, “compromis[ing] the unique position 
of the free press.”53 The court reasoned that the Times’s FHA 
responsibilities were distinct from its protected speech involving 
news stories and editorials.54 The Times argued that making it “an 
enforcer of otherwise desirable laws” was an unconstitutional 
burden.55 The court dismissed the newspaper’s concerns, 
emphasizing that only racial messages were at issue and “the ‘would-
be regulators,’ namely the plaintiffs, are entirely willing to bear the 
burden of proving at trial that the advertisements published by the 
Times indicated a racial preference.”56 The court was not convinced 
by the Times’s contention that it was incapable of monitoring housing 
advertisements because the Times routinely screened advertisements 
for a number of reasons, and, as a policy matter, it “would undermine 
other civil rights laws.”57 
Finally, the Times voiced its concern that allowing the claims 
would “lead to a large number of staggering, perhaps crushing, 
damage awards that might over time impair the press’s role in 
society.”58 This did not strike the court “as a reason to immunize 
publishers from any liability . . . . Rather, it is reason to assert judicial 
control over the size of damage awards for emotional injury in 
 
 52. Id. at 1002 (citing Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 53. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1003. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1004. 
 57. Id. The court noted that “[g]iven that this extensive monitoring . . . [is] routinely 
performed it strains credulity beyond the breaking point to assert that monitoring ads for racial 
messages imposes an unconstitutional burden.” Id. 
 58. Id. at 1005. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 also made the “option [of 
going directly to court] easier to use and more attractive by extending the statute of limitations 
. . . to two years, and by eliminating the $1,000 cap on punitive damages and the ‘financial 
inability’ limitation on the award of attorney’s fees.” Robert G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair 
Housing Litigation, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 745, 749 (1993). 
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individual cases.”59 The court affirmed the district court’s refusal to 
dismiss the case.60 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.61 is also central to 
understanding the interpretation of the FHA in conjunction with other 
statutes. In 1965, Jones and his wife sued a private housing developer 
for refusing to sell them a home because they were African 
American.62 The couple’s claim, which relied on the Civil Rights Act 
of 1886,63 was dismissed by the district court and the Eighth Circuit 
because the Act was held only to apply to state action.64 The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that “§ 1982 bars all racial discrimination, 
private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property.”65 The 
Court concluded that “[the] enactment [of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968] had no effect upon § 1982.”66 
Since the passage of the FHA, HUD has issued a number of 
regulations regarding § 3604(c). Rules codified in the Code of 
Federal Regulations (“C.F.R.”) have often been cited by courts 
interpreting § 3604(c)67 and are entitled to deference under Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.68 Section 
 
 59. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1005. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 62. Id. at 412. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). The statute states: “All citizens of the United States shall 
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” Id. 
 64. Jones, 392 U.S. at 412. 
 65. Id. at 413. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 was passed after the Court heard oral 
argument; the parties submitted briefs discussing whether the Act’s passage had any effect on 
the litigation. Id. at 417–18 n.21. 
 66. Id. at 416. The Court relied on § 815 of the 1968 Act, currently codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3615 (2006), which states that “[n]othing in this subchapter shall be constructed to invalidate 
or limit any law of a State or political subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in 
which this subchapter shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as 
are granted by this subchapter.” Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 n.1 (2d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 68. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(requiring courts to defer to administrative agencies when a “statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue [if] the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute”). For an exhaustive list of FHA cases citing HUD interpretations, see SCHWEMM, 
supra note 32, at § 7:5 n.17. 
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109 of the C.F.R. contained detailed guidance about the “[u]se of 
words, phrases, symbols and visual aids” in housing advertising.69 In 
1996, this section was removed in response to President Clinton’s 
directive to administrative agencies to eliminate outdated 
regulations.70 However, this section, along with other internal HUD 
communications, is still relied on as representing HUD’s 
interpretation of the law.71 One internal communication has shown 
HUD’s approval of the application of § 3604(c) to the Internet,72 but 
it is not entitled to deference from courts.73 
Education and outreach are two other mechanisms by which HUD 
seeks to end housing discrimination. The agency recently conducted 
two studies to determine the public’s knowledge of and support for 
fair housing laws.74 Public awareness of fair housing laws is 
 
 69. 24 C.F.R. pt. 109, available at http://www.ncfhc.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method= 
page.display&pageid=605.  
 70. Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies on Regulatory Reform, 1 PUB. 
PAPERS 304 (Mar. 4, 1995); see also Office of the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and 
Equal Opportunity, Regulatory Reinvention, Streamlining of HUD’s Regulations Implementing 
the Fair Housing Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 14378 (Apr. 1, 1996) (“While this information is very 
helpful to HUD’s clients, HUD will more appropriately provide this information through 
handbook guidance or other materials, rather than maintain it in title 24.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. and 
Equal Opportunity, to Senior HUD Fair Hous. Enforcement Staff (Jan. 9, 1995), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/disabilities/sect804achtenberg.pdf (providing FHEO 
“Guidance Regarding Advertisements Under § 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act,” including 
reference to searching for roommates). 
 72. See Memorandum from Bryan Greene, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement and 
Programs, to FHEO Reg’l Dirs. (Sept. 20, 2006), available at www.fairhousing.com/include/ 
media/pdf/Websites.pdf. Secretary Greene analogizes discriminatory advertising on Web sites 
to newspaper violations of the FHA and concludes that the CDA does not immunize Web sites 
from FHA liability. He recommends that “proposed conciliation agreements include provisions 
designed to prevent discriminatory advertisements from being posted to the Web site; this may 
include the Web site agreeing to practices such as screening, filtering, pop-up warnings, or user 
self-certification.” Id. 
 73. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such as 
those in opinion letters . . . policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all 
of which lack the force of law, do not warrant Chevron-style deference. . . . [They] are ‘entitled 
to respect’ . . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ‘power to persuade.’”) 
(citations omitted). But see Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The 
agency’s view] warrants Chevron deference if it represents the authoritative view of the 
[agency].”). 
 74. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DO 
WE KNOW MORE NOW? TRENDS IN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, SUPPORT, AND USE OF FAIR 
HOUSING LAW (2006), available at www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/FairHousingSurvey 
Report.pdf [hereinafter “HUD 2006 STUDY”]; OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. 
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particularly important for enforcement because “complainants act not 
only on their own behalf but also ‘as private attorneys general in 
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest 
priority.’”75 A 2002 report revealed that one-half of adult Americans 
can identify discriminatory housing behavior, but knowledge about 
specific protected classes varied greatly.76 For purposes of 
enforcement of the FHA by individuals, perhaps the most important 
finding was that 14 percent of the respondents (the equivalent of 28 
million people) had experienced housing discrimination, but only 17 
percent of those had taken any action in response.77 HUD’s 2006 
follow-up report found that knowledge of fair housing laws remained 
the same, but that support for them had slightly increased.78 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act as Title V of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.79 Section 230 of the CDA 
provides “[p]rotection for private blocking and screening of offensive 
material.”80 Specifically, the CDA requires that ISPs not be treated as 
publishers or speakers of “information provided by another 
 
DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE 
NATION’S FAIR HOUSING LAWS (2002), available at www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
hmwk.pdf [hereinafter “HUD 2002 STUDY”]. Both studies involved telephone surveys in which 
participants were given ten scenarios and asked to identify the eight scenarios that violated the 
FHA. HUD 2006 STUDY, supra, at i–ii. 
 75. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting the Solicitor 
General). 
 76. HUD 2002 STUDY, supra note 74, at vi–vii. For instance, only 38 percent knew “that 
it is generally illegal to treat families with children any differently from households without 
children.” Id. at vii. 
 77. Id. at ix. The report acknowledged that it did not objectively measure housing 
discrimination because it allowed respondents to define discrimination, but they were asked 
about perceived discrimination after the survey was completed. Id. For an assessment of 
housing discrimination complaints in 2006, see Deborah Barfield Berry & Robert Benincasa, A 
Growing Number Allege Unfair Treatment in Housing Market, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2007, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-28-housing-main_N.htm.  
 78. HUD 2006 STUDY, supra note 74, at ii. 
 79. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). The Telecommunications Act was Congress’s first 
comprehensive adjustment to communications law since the passage of the Communications 
Act of 1934, which the 1996 Act amended. Sen. Ted Stevens, Policy Essay, The Internet and 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 5, 5–6 (1998). 
 80. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). This Note will refer to this section of the CDA as “§ 230.” 
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information content provider [(“ICP”)].”81 The legislative history of 
§ 230 reveals that Congress was responding to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 
v. Prodigy Services Co.,82 a New York appellate court case that held 
Prodigy, an ISP, liable as a publisher of third-party information.83 
The Conference Committee believed that treating an ISP as a 
publisher when it censors content would make it difficult for parents 
to protect their children from objectionable content because ISPs 
would choose not to screen content rather than risk being held 
liable.84 Accordingly, the CDA eliminates civil liability for ISPs that 
“restrict access to or availability of material”85 and requires that ISPs 
not be treated as publishers of third-party content.86 Finally, the CDA 
enumerates laws on which it has no effect, but it does not mention 
federal civil rights laws.87 
The first case to indicate the breadth of protection that § 230 
would afford ISPs was Zeran v. America Online, Inc.88 The plaintiff 
tried to hold America Online (“AOL”) liable for not quickly 
 
 81. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). “The term ‘information content provider’ means any 
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” Id. 
§ 230(f)(3). 
 82. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 031063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (concluding that Prodigy was a publisher of content on an 
electronic bulletin board because it exercised “editorial control” by utilizing an “automatic 
software screening program” and manual review by employees to enforce its publicized content 
guidelines).  
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996), at 194 (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of 
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which 
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own 
because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”).  
 84. Id. For an overview of § 230’s legislative history, see Chang, supra note 4, at 988–94 
(“[T]he CDA as enacted ultimately embodies a political compromise between the Senate and 
the House that provides for greater governmental regulation of the Internet and encourages an 
active role for [ISPs] in screening offensive online material.”). See also Robert Cannon, The 
Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on 
the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 64–72 (1996); Ken S. Myers, 
Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
163, 174–78 (2006). 
 85. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). 
 86. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 87. See id. § 230(e)(1)–(4) (not affecting criminal law, intellectual property law, 
inconsistent state law, or Communications Privacy law). 
 88. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). For a timeline of § 230(c)(1) 
cases, see Myers, supra note 84, at 205–08. 
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removing false messages posted by a third party.89 An anonymous 
third party posted a fictitious message on an AOL bulletin board six 
days after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing claiming that Zeran was 
selling shirts celebrating the event.90 
In holding that § 230 afforded complete immunity to AOL, the 
Fourth Circuit explained two chief purposes of the CDA. The first is 
to preserve “the robust nature of Internet communication” by 
minimizing any governmental interference;91 the second is to 
incentivize ISPs to prevent offensive material from being posted.92 
The court cautioned that holding AOL liable after notification would 
not be a workable solution because “[e]ach notification would require 
a careful yet rapid investigation of the circumstances surrounding the 
posted information, a legal judgment concerning the information’s 
defamatory character, and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether 
to risk liability by allowing the continued publication of that 
information.”93 Zeran’s holding that “§ 230 creates a federal 
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers 
liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service”94 was the basis for several other jurisdictions’ interpretation 
of the CDA.95 
 
 89. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328. Zeran also argued that AOL should have posted a retraction 
and screened for similar postings after he notified them of the false statements. Id. 
 90. Id. at 329. Zeran was overwhelmed by angry phone calls, including death threats, 
from Oklahoma City residents. He also sued an Oklahoma City radio station because an 
announcer read the posting on the air and encouraged listeners to call Zeran. Id.  
 91. Id. at 330. 
 92. Id. at 331. 
 93. Id. at 333. Thus, in upholding the district court’s summary judgment for AOL, the 
Fourth Circuit emphasized the chilling effect on free speech that Zeran’s position would entail. 
Some Web sites rely on community moderation to remove inappropriate material rather than 
Web site staff. Craigslist, for example, allows users to “flag” housing ads that state 
discriminatory preferences. Craigslist Flags and Community Moderation, http://www.craigslist. 
org/about/help/flags_and_community_moderation (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). “If a post 
receives enough negative flags it will automatically be removed (only one flag per person per 
post is counted).” Id. 
 94. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added). 
 95. See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc., v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st 
Cir. 2007); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe v. 
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 
(3d Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984–85 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998). 
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Two other cases involving AOL also demonstrate the robust 
immunity § 230 has afforded ISPs. In Blumenthal v. Drudge,96 two 
employees of the White House sued Matt Drudge and AOL for 
defamation resulting from allegations of spousal abuse on the Drudge 
Report.97 AOL paid Drudge to create content, marketed the Web site 
to its customers, and reserved the right to edit his content.98 Despite 
this editorial control, the court found that “AOL was nothing more 
than a provider of an interactive computer service on which the 
Drudge Report was carried” and was therefore granted immunity by 
§ 230.99  
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co., Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,100 
the plaintiff, a publicly owned computer software firm, sued AOL for 
defamation resulting from inaccurate information about its share 
price and volume on an AOL Web site.101 AOL deleted this third-
party information when it discovered the errors; the plaintiff argued 
that AOL acted as an ICP by doing so.102 As in Blumenthal, AOL’s 
ability to delete content was not enough for it to lose § 230 
immunity.103 
The Ninth Circuit further defined the limits of § 230 immunity in 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.104 The plaintiff, a professional 
actress, sought to hold the defendant, the operator of the dating Web 
site Matchmaker.com, liable for defamation when an anonymous 
third party created a fictitious profile for her.105 Matchmaker.com 
required its users to complete intricate questionnaires soliciting a 
variety of information.106 The Ninth Circuit held that 
Matchmaker.com’s solicitation of information and aggregation of it 
 
 96. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 44. 
 97. Id. at 46. The Drudge Report is a news aggregation and gossip Web site. 
http://www.drudgereport.com (last visited Nov. 11, 2008).  
 98. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47. 
 99. Id. at 50. The court conceded that AOL would not have § 230 immunity if it had 
jointly developed the content, but there was no evidence that AOL had done so. 
 100. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 983. 
 102. Id. at 985–86. 
 103. Id. at 986. 
 104. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 105. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122. Masterson also sued for invasion of privacy, 
misappropriation of the right of publicity, and negligence. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1121. 
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into a profile that could be matched with others did not justify 
holding it liable as an ICP.107 The court held that “so long as a third 
party willingly provides the essential published content, the 
interactive service provider receives full immunity regardless of the 
specific editing or selection process.”108 
A few recent cases have indicated that § 230 immunity may have 
slightly narrowed since Zeran was decided.109 In Doe v. GTE 
Corp.,110 college athletes who were unknowingly videotaped in 
locker rooms sued GTE, an ISP, under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act111 for allowing the footage to be sold 
on various Web sites.112 In dicta,113 the Seventh Circuit indicated that 
reading § 230(c)(2) as a grant of immunity only when the ISP does 
not create the objectionable material would be more sensible because 
the goal of this section of the CDA is to encourage ISP blocking of 
offensive third-party material.114 Furthermore, the court reasoned that 
reading § 230(c)(1) as a definition rather than a conferral of 
immunity115 means that state laws requiring ISPs to protect third 
 
 107. Id. at 1124–25. The court reasoned that “no profile has any content until a user 
actively creates it.” Id. at 1124. 
 108. Id. at 1124. 
 109. See, e.g., Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) (approving of 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Doe); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, 
LLC, 199 F. App’x 738 (11th Cir. 2006) (requiring defendants to prove that they are not an ICS 
and implying that merely inserting words into third party content is enough to make a Web site 
an ICS). 
 110. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 111. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), is not preempted by the CDA. 47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(4) (2006). 
 112. Doe, 347 F.3d at 656. 
 113. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal because there were no applicable state 
laws requiring ISPs to remove harmful material. Id. at 662. Thus, the court’s pontification on 
§ 230 was unnecessary for it to decide the case. 
 114. Id. at 660. The court also recognized the possibility, which was adopted by the 
Craigslist court, that “§ 230(c)(1) forecloses liability that depends on deeming the ISP a 
‘publisher’—defamation law would be a good example of such liability.” Id. 
 115. This subsection, which has the caption “Treatment of publisher or speaker,” states that 
ICSs “shall [not] be treated as the publisher or speaker” of third party content; it does not 
mention liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). In contrast, § 230(c)(2), the caption of which is 
“Civil liability,” specifically enumerates reasons that may not be used to hold an ISP liable. Id. 
§ 230(c)(2). But see Myers, supra note 84, at 178 (“Judge Easterbrook’s discomfort should not 
so much be with the incongruity between the caption and the text, but with Congress’s 
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parties would not be affected by the CDA’s preemption of state 
law.116 The court worried that reading § 230(c)(1) as an immunity 
clause would encourage ISPs to take no action, a result at variance 
with the section’s caption, “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking 
and screening of offensive material.”117  
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Doe was relied upon by the 
plaintiffs in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under the 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.118 A nonprofit organization composed of 
law firms, the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under 
the Law (“CLC”), sued Craigslist for violating § 3604(c) through its 
hosting of allegedly discriminatory housing advertisements.119 After 
examining § 230 case law, the district court concluded that Zeran 
only “bars those causes of action that would require treating an ICS 
as a publisher of third-party content” rather than “‘any cause of 
action.’”120 Criticizing Zeran’s language as “overbroad,” the court 
emphasized a fatal flaw in the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning: by acting 
as a traditional publisher and altering content, an ISP loses any 
immunity afforded by § 230(c)(1) because the ISP would be posting 
information it helped create.121 The court granted summary judgment 
to Craigslist, “hold[ing] that, at a minimum, Section 230(c)(1) bars 
 
assumption that [ISPs] actually would help ‘control’ the Internet once Congress granted such 
immunity.”). 
 116. Doe, 347 F.3d at 660 (explaining that 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) preempts state and local 
laws that are inconsistent with § 230). 
 117. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)). 
 118. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F. 
Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006). See also Chang, supra note 4, at 986 (“[I]f § 230(c)(1)’s ban on 
the treatment of [ISPs] as publishers or speakers is read to immunize [ISPs] for all liability 
arising out of failure to screen online content, [ISPs] would have no legal incentive to take 
action to screen objectionable material or develop blocking technologies.”). But see Leslie Paul 
Machado, Immunity Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996: A Short Primer, 
J. INTERNET L. 10 No. 3, 9 (2006) (“[Chang’s] argument ignores, however, that it is impractical, 
and may be impossible, to screen the number of postings that are placed on a Web site like 
craigslist every day.”). 
 119. Craigslist, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 682. Advertisements in the record included phrases such 
as “NO MINORITIES,” “Non-women of Color NEED NOT APPLY,” “young cool landlord 
who wants one nice quiet person to rent her basement,” “Apt. too small for families with small 
children,” and “African Americans and Arabians tend to clash with me so that won’t work out.” 
Id. at 685–86. 
 120. Id. at 693. 
 121. Id. at 694–95. 
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claims, like the CLC’s claim, that requires [sic] publishing as a 
critical element.”122  
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision, 
underscoring the “limited role of § 230(c)(1)” and recognizing that 
Craigslist was attempting “to expand § 230(c)(1) beyond its 
language.”123 Chief Judge Easterbrook relied on the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in Doe to explain that § 230(c) is not “a general prohibition 
of civil liability for web-site operators and other online content hosts 
. . . . [P]erhaps § 230(c)(1) forecloses any liability that depends on 
deeming the ISP a ‘publisher’—defamation law would be a good 
example of such liability—while permitting the states to regulate 
ISPs in their capacity as intermediaries.”124 Also, Chief Judge 
Easterbrook emphasized that Congress’s seeming inattention to the 
Fair Housing Act when it passed the CDA is irrelevant because “[t]he 
question is not whether Congress gave any thought to the Fair 
Housing Act, but whether it excluded § 3604(c) from the reach of 
§ 230(c)(1).”125 Given this view of § 230, “only in a capacity as 
publisher could craigslist be liable under § 3604(c).”126 
The most recent case to tackle the CDA’s application to § 3604(c) 
is Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 
LLC.127 Two fair housing groups sued the roommate-matching Web 
site for violations of § 3604(c).128 The Web site solicited preferences 
via drop down menus, allowed users to create their own profiles with 
additional comments, organized the information to allow users to 
 
 122. Id. at 696–98 (footnote omitted). 
 123. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 
666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 124. Id. at 669–70 (citation omitted). 
 125. Id. at 671 (“Congress need not think about a subject for a law to affect it; effect of 
general rules continues unless limited by superseding enactments.”) (citing Regional Rail 
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126–27 (1974)). 
 126. Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671. 
 127. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 
(9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part en banc, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 128. Roommates.com, 489 F.3d at 924. Roommates.com was also sued for violations of 
various state fair housing laws. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (2006) (allowing state and local laws 
that guarantee fair housing rights). For a list of state fair housing laws, see Craigslist State Fair 
Housing Laws, http://www.craigslist.org/about/state_fair_housing_laws.html (last visited Nov. 
11, 2008).  
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search listings, and edited the user-supplied information in minor 
ways.129 The Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com, “[b]y 
categorizing, channeling and limiting the distribution of users’ 
profiles . . . provides an additional layer of information that it is 
‘responsible’ at least ‘in part’ for creating or developing.”130 
Therefore, CDA immunity was not available and the case was 
remanded for the district court to determine if the alleged actions 
violated the FHA.131 
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld the portion of the 
original appellate decision ruling that Roommates.com lost CDA 
immunity because of the extent of its involvement in developing 
content.132 Chief Judge Kozinski wrote for the majority that 
“Roommate’s website is designed to force subscribers to divulge 
protected characteristics and discriminatory preferences, and to match 
those who have rooms with those who are looking for rooms based 
on criteria that appear to be prohibited by the FHA,” thus 
distinguishing it from the Web site at issue in Carafano.133 Like the 
previous Roommates.com decision, the majority emphasized the Web 
site’s active solicitation of discriminatory material: “Roommate does 
not merely provide a framework that could be utilized for proper or 
improper purposes; rather, Roommate’s work in developing the 
discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers and discriminatory 
search mechanism is directly related to the alleged illegality of the 
site.”134 The case was again remanded for the district court to 
 
 129. Roomates.com, 489 F.3d at 924–26. Minor editing included changing a user-selected 
option of “‘I will not live with children . . . [to] ‘no children please.’” Id. at 926 n.6. 
 130. Id. at 929 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f)(3) (2006)). 
 131. Id. at 929–30. The court found that Roommates.com was not liable for the extended 
essays in the “additional comments” section of user profiles because they were not sufficiently 
involved in the creation or development of that information. Id. at 929. 
 132. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1174 n.37 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 133. Id. at 1172 (“The salient fact in Carafano was that the website’s classifications of user 
characteristics did absolutely nothing to enhance the defamatory sting of the message, to 
encourage defamation or to make defamation easier: The site provided neutral tools specifically 
designed to match romantic partners depending on their voluntary inputs.”). 
 134. Id. at 1172. Roommate.com’s open comments section, which allows users to write 
whatever they want without having to choose from preformed answers, still received CDA 
immunity. Id. at 1173–74. 
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determine whether Roommates.com violated the FHA or California 
fair housing laws.135 
III. ANALYSIS 
As the case law of the CDA has demonstrated and other 
commentators have noted,136 immunity for Web sites publishing 
discriminatory housing advertisements seems virtually assured at 
present. Litigation over the application of the FHA in cyberspace is 
likely to continue, and the tension between the FHA and the CDA 
will probably not be resolved until Congress intervenes.137 This Note 
proposes that courts issue bright-line rules for interactive computer 
services to follow so that they will not unwittingly become ICPs and 
therefore lose CDA immunity. In the absence of bright-line rules 
from courts, Congress should step in and provide them. Just as the 
CDA’s legislative history shows that Congress intended to overrule 
the reasoning of one particular case,138 Congress could scan the case 
law and choose the rules it considers best. In either event, this Note 
further proposes that Congress should ensure that roommate seekers 
who qualify for the FHA’s “Mrs. Murphy” exemption should be 
allowed to place discriminatory housing advertisements online for the 
reasons that follow. This could be accomplished by amending either 
the FHA or the CDA. 
While fair housing is an important issue, the “generous 
construction” for the FHA that the Supreme Court announced in 
 
 135. Id. at 1175. 
 136. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 8, at 217 (“The state of fair housing on the Internet is 
clear, but bleak. . . . [A]s the Internet evolves into a safe haven for housing discrimination . . . . 
consumers will likely face an increasing prevalence of discriminatory housing advertisements in 
the future.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Mike Hughlett, Craigslist Suit Faces Speech Hurdle; Communications Law 
May Trump Fair Housing, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 26, 2006, at C1 (“[T]here is a ‘real good 
chance Congress will revisit it. . . . You can’t take a fair housing law that governs all 
advertising and say, ‘We have this new technology that a younger generation uses—it’s not 
covered’. . . . You have a hole here that is just going to get bigger.”) (quoting fair housing 
expert Professor Robert Schwemm); see also Adam Liptak, The Ads Discriminate, But Does 
the Web?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at A10 (“Whatever the merits of the debate, judicial 
decisions suggest that only Congressional action can change the legal landscape.”). 
 138. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (overruling Stratton-Oakmont v. 
Prodigy). 
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Trafficante139 has to have some limit. Common sense dictates that the 
FHA’s restrictions on speech should not extend to individuals 
seeking a roommate to share intimate living quarters—an association 
quite different from the traditional landlord-tenant relationship. As 
Professor Eugene Volokh has pointed out,140 the right to intimate 
association, which has been recognized by the Supreme Court,141 
together with free speech rights, should give an individual the right to 
state roommate preferences in online advertisements. Case law 
interpreting the government’s ability to regulate speech in the context 
of the FHA is inapplicable to roommate situations. In Hunter,142 the 
Fourth Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the 
government’s ability to regulate commercial speech;143 it is not 
obvious that personal roommate advertisements are in fact 
commercial speech.144 
In Ragin,145 the Second Circuit rejected the newspaper’s freedom 
of speech argument because commercial real estate advertisements 
indicating a prohibited preference “‘further an illegal commercial 
activity: racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real estate.’”146 
Because roommates who qualify for immunity under the FHA’s 
“Mrs. Murphy” exemption are allowed to choose roommates based 
on otherwise prohibited preferences, the placing of an advertisement 
does not further an illegal activity.147 Since § 3604(c) prohibits not 
 
 139. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). 
 140. Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/ 
archive_2007_05_13-2007_05_19.shtml#1179259134 (May 15, 2007, 15:58 PST). 
 141. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); 
Nancy C. Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 269 (2006). 
 142. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 143. Id. at 211. 
 144. See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 20, at 267–94. Schwemm argues that the language 
“‘with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling’ . . . . indicates 3604(c)’s ban on discriminatory 
statements applies only to communications by landlords, realtors, and other housing 
professionals made in the context of the sale or rental of a dwelling.” Id. at 269–70 (citation 
omitted).  
 145. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 146. Id. at 1002 (quoting Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 726 F. Supp. 953, 962 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989)). 
 147. See also Adam Liptak, Fair Housing, Free Speech and Choosy Roommates, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at A12 (“In choosing a real roommate—somebody who shares your 
bathroom and kitchen—you should be allowed to have and disclose whatever idiosyncratic 
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only discriminatory advertising, but also discriminatory statements, 
the FHA provides no legal avenue for an individual to find a suitable 
roommate other than placing an advertisement with no identifying 
information involving protected categories and sifting through every 
response. 
While the FHA is intended to safeguard the right to fair housing 
for all protected groups, it was initially passed to help minorities.148 
One should view the current ability of individuals to search for 
roommates with that same frame of reference. For instance, suppose 
that two Orthodox Jewish college freshmen seek a third roommate to 
share their apartment. While they live in a town where the 
overwhelming majority of residents are non-Jewish, they would 
prefer to live with another Orthodox Jew.149 The information 
asymmetry that results from prohibiting any information based on 
protected categories creates a formidable barrier to these individuals 
finding an acceptable roommate.150 Furthermore, it seems illogical to 
 
ideas you have about your living arrangements, even discriminatory ones. Roommate ads are 
more like personal dating ads, where discrimination is rampant and accepted . . . .”). 
 148. Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair 
Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 435 
(1998). 
 149. See, e.g., Sarah Schillachi, Bulletin Board with a Difference; Orthodox Jews Have 
Their Own Craigslist, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, NJ), Jan. 4, 2008, at A01 (describing 
“Luach.com . . . a bulletin board Web site serving the Orthodox Jewish community,” with job 
postings and roommate advertisements). Any roommate advertisements placed on this Web site 
would likely be considered illegal by indicating a preference based on religion because of the 
medium involved. See 24 C.F.R. 100.75(c)(3) (2008) (“Discriminatory notices, statements and 
advertisements include . . . [s]electing media or locations for advertising the sale or rental of 
dwellings which deny particular segments of the housing market information about housing 
opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national 
origin.”). 
 150. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, YOU CAN’T SAY THAT!: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL 
LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS 134 (2003). Professor Bernstein discusses the 
consequences of roommates not being able to advertise their preferences:  
The result is that persons who place classified ads for roommates waste their time, as 
well as the time of many of those who respond to their ads, by inviting and dealing 
with inquiries from persons who fail to meet the actual ‘discriminatory criteria.’ The 
advertising restriction can be particularly onerous in jurisdictions that ban housing 
discrimination on the basis of criteria beyond the standard categories . . . covered by 
federal law.  
Id. Professor Bernstein also argues that HUD’s interpretation of the FHA is unconstitutional 
because it allows “[g]overnment authorities . . . to dictate to commercial entities the content of 
their advertisements.” Id. at 76. For a discussion of HUD’s interpretations to which Professor 
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prevent people from stating a preference when they are explicitly 
allowed by the FHA to discriminate in whom they choose as a 
roommate.  
Allowing roommate advertisements to state preferences can 
empower minorities to find those with whom they wish to live. 
Rather than causing individuals to splinter off into homogeneous 
groups, this could facilitate residential housing integration, an 
important goal of the FHA.151 This empowerment of minority 
roommate seekers to find each other is analogous to professional 
networks for Indian and Chinese computer engineers in Silicon 
Valley who pool their resources because they perceive themselves as 
susceptible to employment discrimination.152 While plaintiffs like the 
CLC in Craigslist identified negative, if not offensive, advertisements 
discriminating against protected classes,153 roommate advertisements 
can also discriminate in “positive” ways by seeking roommates from 
different protected classes. This is similar to the FHA’s immunity for 
advertisements that discriminate in favor of protected groups, such as 
the disabled.154 The one exception to this line of reasoning is 
 
Bernstein is referring, contained in the withdrawn 24 C.F.R. pt. 109, see supra notes 69–73 and 
accompanying text.  
 151. See SCHWEMM, supra note 32, at § 2:3 (“[The] legislative history makes clear that 
residential integration is a major goal of the Fair Housing Act, separate and independent of the 
goal of expanding minority housing opportunities.”); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (“[A]s Senator Mondale who drafted [42 U.S.C. § 3610] said, 
the reach of the proposed law was to replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living 
patterns.’”) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 3422 (1968)). 
 152. See Alan Hyde, A Closer Look at the Emerging Employment Law of Silicon Valley’s 
High-Velocity Labour Market, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: 
TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES AND POSSIBILITIES 233, 234–35 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 
2002); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11—12 (2006). Professor Bagenstos argues that Professor Hyde’s 
“suggest[ion] that similar identity-based networks could improve the job prospects of other 
groups who are subject to discrimination. . . . will merely entrench the problem by facilitating 
segregated workplaces.” Id. at 12. Similarly, allowing individuals not subject to the FHA to 
publish discriminatory housing advertisements will not necessarily further housing integration, 
but it will enable minorities to more easily live with whomever they choose. Housing 
integration could be furthered with discriminatory roommate advertisements because it allows 
individuals to easily locate potential roommates who are different from them. 
 153. See supra note 119.  
 154. See 24 C.F.R. § 109.20(b)(6) (1994) (“Nothing in this part restricts the inclusion of 
information about the availability of accessible housing in advertising of dwellings.”); see also 
id. § 109.16(b) (approving of advertisements “designed to attract persons to dwellings who 
would not ordinarily be expected to apply” or to remedy past discrimination). 
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discrimination based on race. Because 42 U.S.C. § 1982155 “bars all 
racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of 
property,”156 an advertisement expressing a preference based on race 
would arguably propose an illegal act and should continue to remain 
prohibited. 
One area of concern is that roommate advertisements that state a 
preference will confuse the public, leading it to believe that all 
housing advertisements may lawfully state a discriminatory 
preference. In Craigslist, the CLC complained that publishing “the 
[discriminatory] advertisements misinform home-seekers as to what 
is and is not illegal. . . . [This] may have the effect of sanctioning and 
normalizing discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because 
the public becomes accustomed to seeing such illegal 
advertisements.”157 The recent HUD studies indicate that the public is 
already under-informed about housing discrimination.158 Assuming 
that an individual knows the law, she will certainly be able to 
differentiate between roommate advertisements on a roommate Web 
site and a billboard for the latest subdivision. If § 3604(c) did not 
apply to roommate advertisements, a simple logo could convey to the 
viewer that it is exempt from stating discriminatory preferences, just 
as real estate professionals currently use fair housing logos and 
posters to convey a commitment not to discriminate.159 
One must also consider the cost-benefit analysis of the harm 
avoided by prohibiting discriminatory roommate advertisements. 
Presumably, the additional time and effort required to locate suitable 
roommates without stating a preference were thought to outweigh the 
benefits of keeping housing advertisements free from discrimination 
when the FHA was passed. However, the damages suffered by an 
individual who feels slighted by a discriminatory roommate 
advertisement will probably not be debilitating, and in some instances 
may only be nominal. In fact, reading an online advertisement that 
 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006). 
 156. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
 157. Complaint at 19, Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 06 C 0657), available at http://www.clccrul.org/ 
templates/UserFiles/Documents/craigslistcomplaint.pdf.  
 158. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 159. See 24 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2008). 
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states an individual is not wanted is probably far less traumatic than 
hearing it in person from a potential roommate.160 Furthermore, 
because § 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory statements, an individual 
turning down a potential roommate because he or she is a member of 
a protected category cannot even inform the potential roommate of 
the real reason he or she is being denied housing.161 This could result 
in even more wasted time and energy on the part of those answering 
the advertisements. 
The continued interpretation of CDA immunity for Web sites 
hosting roommate advertisements is critical for the viability of 
housing advertisements on the Internet. Most of the cases involving 
construction of the CDA have correctly applied the statute as 
Congress intended. Zeran is important for its reasoning that holding 
ISPs liable as publishers would be an overwhelming burden and a 
nearly impossible task.162 Likewise, the courts in Blumenthal and Ben 
Ezra properly immunized AOL from liability as a publisher because 
the ISP either had or exercised the power to delete content.163 All 
three of these holdings are supported by the plain text of the CDA.164 
Also, Doe’s reading of § 230(c)(2) as a grant of immunity only when 
the ISP does not create the objectionable content is consistent with 
the CDA’s plain text.165 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Carafano that the solicitation and 
aggregation of information into profiles on Matchmaker.com did not 
 
 160. Cf. Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993) (dismissing a sexual 
harassment claim based on two conversations that were not personally directed at the plaintiff 
and therefore suggesting that discrimination aimed at others is not as upsetting). 
 161. See Schwemm, supra note 20, at 192 (“[T]he smallest housing providers, including 
‘Mrs. Murphy’-type landlords, are barred from making discriminatory statements. Such housing 
providers may engage in discriminatory housing practices, but they cannot tell anyone they are 
doing so.”). 
 162. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 163. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & 
Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 164. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (2006) (“The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation.”); id. § 230(c)(2)(a) (removing liability for ISPs that remove objectionable material, 
“whether or not such material is constitutionally protected”). 
 165. See id. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”). 
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transform the Web site into an ICP166 is also an important bulwark for 
§ 230 immunity because the act of compiling information and making 
it easily retrievable is critical to a Web site’s utility. While the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc panel ruled that “[p]roviding neutral tools for 
navigating websites is fully protected by CDA immunity, absent 
substantial affirmative conduct on the part of the website creator 
promoting the use of such tools for unlawful purposes,”167 its 
standard that a Web site loses CDA immunity when it “materially 
contributed to the unlawfulness of the information” does not give 
clear guidance to Web site operators.168  
Comparing Roommates.com to Craigslist illustrates the need for 
bright-line rules that allow Web sites and ISPs to plan accordingly. 
How much information can a Web site solicit, if any, before it 
becomes an ICP? How extensively can a Web site organize 
unsolicited data before it becomes an ICP?169 Craigslist was an easy 
CDA case because of the hands-off approach taken by the Web site; 
it is basically an electronic bulletin board that allows users to police 
content and take down offensive advertisements.170 Yet other 
 
 166. Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 167. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1174 n.37 (9th Cir. 2008). According to one commentator, the majority emphasized the narrow 
application of its rule, but “it’s virtually impossible to articulate in crystal-clear terms why 
Roommates.com crossed the line while many other websites with similar user interactions still 
qualify for 230. . . . [Plaintiffs] will find some judges who ignore the philosophical statements 
and instead turn a decision on the opinion’s myriad of ambiguities.” Technology and Marketing 
Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/04/roommatescom_de_1.htm (Apr. 3 
2008, 20:05 PST). 
 168. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182–83 (McKeown, J., dissenting). Judge McKeown 
accuses the majority of “collaps[ing] . . . substantive liability with the issue of immunity . . . . 
Whether the information at issue is unlawful and whether the webhost has contributed to its 
unlawfulness are issues analytically independent of the determination of immunity.” Id. 
 169. The Ninth Circuit panel insisted that “[t]he message to website operators is clear: If 
you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal 
content, you will be immune.” Id. at 1174. Yet it is also stated that “[w]ebsites are complicated 
enterprises, and there will always be close cases where a clever lawyer could argue that 
something the website operator did encouraged the illegality. Such close cases, we believe, 
must be resolved in favor of immunity.” Id. at 1174. 
 170. The only services Craigslist provides, other than a spot in cyberspace for individuals 
to place their advertisements, are (1) a category for roommate advertisements, (2) a basic search 
function (which could be duplicated using a standard search engine), and (3) an anonymizing 
email service. Kurth, supra note 8, at 830–31. For an analysis of how search engines could be 
affected by CDA case law, see James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1, 37 (2002) (“[T]he growing integration of search engines with other 
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interactive computer services need to know when they cross the line 
and become information content providers, losing § 230 immunity.171 
Fair housing and integration are important goals, but they must be 
balanced against the rights of roommate seekers to speak freely and 
associate with whomever they want. This is particularly important 
considering the progress that has already been accomplished and the 
massive societal changes that have taken place since the FHA’s 
passage. It is incorrect to characterize roommate searching online as 
commercial activity and it is illogical to preclude individuals from 
talking about what they can legally do. Web sites and ISPs provide an 
important mechanism that allows individuals to find housing quickly 
and easily; they should continue to be protected as long as they are 
not producers of discriminatory content. There is no longer a 
sufficient policy justification to prevent individuals from expressing 
their roommate preferences online. 
CONCLUSION 
The contrast between the Craigslist and Roommates.com cases 
exemplifies the way in which courts are struggling with the 
intersection of the FHA and the CDA. It also shows that fair housing 
groups are willing to take on ICSs despite their bleak prospects of 
success. While courts fine-tune the limits of CDA immunity, 
§ 3604(c)’s application to cyberspace continues to be limited. 
Examining the important cases interpreting the FHA and the CDA, as 
well as scrutinizing the justification for applying § 3604(c) to 
roommate searching online, this Note argues for clear rules for ICSs 
and § 3604(c) exemption for online roommate seekers. In the final 
analysis, it most likely will be up to Congress to produce either result.
 
applications raises concerns, particularly for search engines associated with creative 
communities. . . . [I]f the search engine itself adds some content of its own to the 
recommendation [even one sentence], that additional content might fall outside of Section 230’s 
protections.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Matthew Brodosky, The World Wide Whoa: Old Trusted Protections Can’t 
Be Counted On Anymore When It Comes to Content and Liability in the Wild Web 2.0, RISK & 
INSURANCE, Sept. 1, 2007, at 45 (conveying the concerns of Silicon Valley over the outcome of 
the initial ruling in Roommates.com and recommending “tech E&O,” or technological errors 
and omissions insurance, as one answer to the uncertainty in this area of the law). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
